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For an economy with altruistic parents facing productivity shocks, the optimal estate taxation is progressive:
fortunate parents should face lower net returns on their inheritances.  This progressivity reflects optimal
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iwerning@mit.eduand insurance of newborns. Our main result is that estate taxation should be progressive:
fortunate parents should face a higher marginal tax rate on their bequests.
We begin with a two-period Mirrleesian economy with two generations linked by parental
altruism; we then extend our analysis to an inﬁnite horizon economy similar to Atkeson and
Lucas (1995) and Albanesi and Sleet (2004). In our simplest economy, a continuum of parents
live during the ﬁrst period. In the second period each is replaced by a single descendent
and parents are altruistic towards this child. Parents work, consume and bequeath; children
simply consume.1 Following Mirrlees (1971), parents ﬁrst observe a random productivity draw
and then exert work eﬀort. Both productivity and work eﬀort are private information; only
output, the product of the two, is publicly observable. We study the entire set of constrained
Pareto eﬃcient allocations and derive their implications for marginal tax rates.
For this economy, if one assumes that the social welfare criterion coincides with the par-
ent’s expected utility, then Atkinson and Stiglitz’s (1976) celebrated uniform-taxation result
applies: the optimal estate tax is zero. That is, when no direct weight is placed on the welfare
of children, income should be taxed nonlinearly (as in Mirrlees, 1971), but bequests should
go untaxed. This arrangement ensures that the intertemporal consumption choice made by
parents—trading oﬀ their own consumption against their child’s consumption—is undistorted.
As a result, the inheritability of welfare across generations is perfect: a child’s consumption
rises one-for-one with that of its parent. In eﬀect, eﬃciency dictates that altruism be exploited
to provide higher incentives for parents, by manipulating their children’s consumption. In-
equality for the children’s generation is created as a byproduct, since their expected welfare
is of no direct concern. Indeed, in this economy, if parent were not altruistic, the children’s
expected utility would be higher at any eﬃcient allocation.
While this describes one eﬃcient allocation, the picture is incomplete. In this economy
the parent and child are distinct individuals, albeit linked through parental altruism, a form
of externality. Thus, a complete welfare analysis requires examining the ex-ante utility of
both parents and children. Figure 1 depicts our economy’s Pareto frontier graphically, which
is peaked because altruistic parent’s welfare decreases if the child is made relatively too mis-
erable. The allocation discussed in the previous paragraph is a particular point lying on the
Pareto frontier: the peak which maximizes the welfare of parents; marked as point A in the
ﬁgure. In this paper we explore other eﬃcient arrangements representing points lying on on
the downward sloping section of the the Pareto frontier, to the right of its peak.
Away from point A, a role for estate taxation emerges: eﬃcient allocations which lie to
the right of the peak can be implemented with a simple tax system that confronts parents
with separate nonlinear schedules for income and estate taxes. Our main result is that the
1 Although some readers have remarked that they ﬁnd this assumption realistic, it will be relaxed when




Figure 1: Pareto frontier between ex-ante utility for parent, vp, and child, vc.
optimal estate tax schedule is convex: fortunate high-skilled parents face a higher marginal
tax rate on their bequests.
The intuition for this result is that progressive estate taxation arises to insure children
against their parent’s luck. The progressive estate tax lowers consumption inequality within
the children’s generation—which is desirable as long as some weight, however small, is placed
on them in the social welfare criterion—while still providing incentives to parents. A child’s
consumption still varies with their parent’s, providing some incentives, but now does so less
than one-for-one, providing some insurance. In other words, consumption mean reverts across
generations, making the inheritability of welfare is imperfect. The optimal progressivity in
estate taxes reﬂects this mean reversion: fortunate dynasties must face a lower net return on
bequests so that they choose a consumption path declining towards the mean.
Our stark conclusion on the progressivity of estate taxation strongly contrasts with the
theoretical ambiguity in the shape of the optimal income tax schedule. Mirrlees’s (1971)
seminal paper showed that for bounded distributions of skills the optimal marginal income
tax rates are regressive at the top (see also Seade, 1982; Tuomala, 1990; Ebert, 1992). More
recently, Diamond (1998) has shown that the opposite—progressivity at the top—is true with
certain unbounded skill distributions (see also Saez, 2001). In contrast, our results on the
progressivity of the estate tax do not depend on any assumptions regarding the distribution
of skills.
We then extend our analysis for the two-period setup to an inﬁnite-horizon economy with
non-overlapping generations. This extension is important for at least two reasons.
First, it provides a motivation for studying eﬃcient allocations which do not simply maxi-
mize the expected utility of the very ﬁrst generation—the analogues of point A from Figure 1
3for the inﬁnite-horizon economy. Indeed, these allocations have everyone in distant gener-
ations converging to misery, with zero consumption. This is a version of the immiseration
result shown by Atkeson and Lucas (1992) for a taste shock economy, which we extend here to
the Mirrleesian economy. Loosely speaking, if we continue to plot the expected utility of the
last generation on the horizontal axis, then as we extend the horizon point A moves further
and further to the left, towards misery. This provides a rationale for focusing on eﬃcient
allocations that place positive weight on future generations, the analogues of the downward
sloping section of the Pareto frontier, to the right of point A on the ﬁgure. However, as we
show here by extending the analysis in Farhi and Werning (2005), this result is special, by
placing weight on future generations, so that the social discount factor is greater than the
private one, a steady state exists, misery is avoided and there is social mobility.
Second, the inﬁnite horizon version of our model allows us to make contact with a grow-
ing literature on dynamic Mirrleesian models, such as Golosov, Kocherlakota and Tsyvinski
(2003), Albanesi and Sleet (2004) and others (see further references in Golosov, Tsyvinski and
Werning, 2006). In our model each individual lives for a single period, observes a productivity
draw and works, and is then replaced by a single descendant in the next period. As usual,
perfect altruism implies that each dynasty behaves as a single inﬁnitely-lived individual, so
our model environment is identical to Albanesi and Sleet (2004). However, our intergener-
ational interpretation of the inﬁnite horizon leads us to study a diﬀerent planning problem,
one that puts direct weight on the expected utility of future generations, or equivalently, one
that has a social discount factor that is higher than the private one. Indeed, to avoid the
immiseration result mentioned above, Albanesi and Sleet impose an ad hoc lower bound on
continuation utility along the equilibrium path; in contrast, our steady-state analysis requires
no such lower imposition.
The progressivity of estate taxes extends to this inﬁnite horizon setup: fortunate parents
face a higher average marginal tax rate on their bequests. Indeed, the average marginal estate
tax rate formula is the same as in the two-period economy. The main diﬀerence between
the two-period and inﬁnite horizon economies is that tax implementations are more involved
in the latter. We adapt Kocherlakota’s (2004) implementation, which yields a marginal tax
estate rate that is zero, on average, for all parents when only the ﬁrst generation is weighed
in the welfare criterion, the analogue of point A.
Throughout this paper, we study an economy without capital, where aggregate consump-
tion equals aggregate produced output plus an endowment. This no-aggregate-savings as-
sumption allows us to focus on redistribution within generations and abstract from transfers
across generations. Unfortunately, it does not allow us to pin down the level of estate taxa-
tion, only its shape. Farhi, Kocherlakota and Werning (2005) extend this model among several
4dimensions—including capital accumulation, life-cycle elements and general skill processes—
and show that our main result on progressive estate taxation is insensitive to this assumption.
Our work relates to a number of recent papers that have explored the implications of
including future generations in the social welfare criterion. Phelan (2005) considered a social
planning problem that weighted all generations equally, which is equivalent to not discounting
the future at all. Farhi and Werning (2005) considered intermediate cases, where future
generations receive a geometrically declining weight. This is equivalent to a social discount
factor that is less than one and higher than the private one. Sleet and Yeltekin (2005) have
studied how such a higher social discount factor may arise from a utilitarian planner without
commitment. None of these papers consider implications for estate taxation.
We organized the rest of the paper in the following way. Section 1 describes the two period
model environment and Section 2 introduces the associated planning problem. Our main
results for this two-period economy are in Section 3. In Section 4 we describe the extension
to an inﬁnite horizon. The main results for that economy are contained in Section 5. We use
Section 6 for concluding remarks.
1 Parent and Child: A Two Period Economy
There are two periods labelled t = 0,1. The parent lives during t = 0 and is replaced by a
single child at t = 1. The parent works and consumes, while the child only consumes. Thus,
an allocation is a triplet of functions (c0(w0),c1(w0),y0(w0)), where c0 and y0 represents the
parent’s consumption and output, and c1 represents the child’s consumption.











where the expectations is over w0 and β < 1. The child’s utility is simply
v1 = u(c1) (2)
The utility function u(c) is increasing, concave and diﬀerentiable; the disutility function h(n)
is assumed increasing, convex and diﬀerentiable.










As usual, the parent’s expected utility can be reinterpreted as that of a ﬁctitious dynasty that
5lives for two periods and discounts at rate β.
Following (Atkeson and Lucas, 1992) and others, we abstract from capital accumulation
to concentrate on the distributional assignment of goods across agents within a period, and
not over time. An allocation is resource feasible if aggregate consumption in both periods is
not greater than the sum of endowments and production:
Z ∞
0






c1(w0)dF(w0) ≤ e1 (5)
Productivity is private information so incentives need to be provided for truthful revelation.
We say that an allocation is incentive compatible if the parent ﬁnds it optimal to reveal her
shock truthfully:











for all productivity realizations w0.
2 Social Welfare and Eﬃcient Allocations
To study all constrained eﬃcient allocations for the two-period economy it is useful to work
with the general welfare criterion
W ≡ v0 + αEv1, (7)
which places some weight α ≥ 0 on the expected utility of children. As we vary α we can
trace out the entire Pareto frontier, since the latter is convex, as illustrated in Figure 1.
Substituting equations (2) and (3) into equation (7) implies the alternative expression
W = E[u(c0) + (β + α)u(c1) − h(y0/w0)].
Thus, the social welfare function is equivalent to the parent’s preferences but with a social
discount factor ˆ β = β + α that is higher than the private one as long as α > 0.
The planning problem maximizes the welfare criterion W over allocations that are resource





[u(c0(w0)) + ˆ βu(c1(w1)) − h(y0(w0)/w0)]dF(w0)
subject to the resource constraints in equations (4)-(5) and the incentive compatibility con-
6straints in equation (6).
It is useful to divide the planning problem into two stages. In the ﬁrst stage the planner
chooses the proﬁle of output y0(w0) and a schedule of incentives ∆(w0), which is equal to
utility from consumption u(c0(w0)) + βu(c1(w0)) up to a constant. In the second stage, the
planner solves the subproblem of how best to provide the incentives ∆(w0), using c0(w0) and
c1(w0). The key feature is that the second stage involves no incentive constraints, these are






[u(c0(w0)) + ˆ βu(c1(w1)) − h(y0(w0)/w0)]dF(w0)
subject to ∆(w) + U = u(c0(w0)) + βu(c1(w0)), the resource constraints in equations (4)-(5)
and the incentive compatibility constraints ∆(w0) − h(y(w0)/w0) ≥ ∆(w) − h(y(w)/w0) for
all w0. Note that the incentive constraint does not involve c0, c1 or U; only ∆ and y0.
For our purposes, it suﬃces to focus on the second stage that takes ∆ and y0 as given,





[u(c0(w0)) + ˆ βu(c1(w1))]dF(w0)
subject to ∆(w0)+U = u(c0(w0))+βu(c1(w1)) and the resource constraints in equations (4)-
(5).
It is convenient to rewrite this problem by changing variables, from consumption to utility
assignments U0(w) = u(c0(w)) and U1(w) = u(c1(w)), since then the objective is then linear

















It is easy to see that both resource constraints must bind at an optimum.
73 The Main Result: Progressive Estate Taxation
In this section we derive two main results for the two-period economy laid out in the previous
section. We ﬁrst show that implicit marginal tax rates on bequests must be progressive.
We then provide a simple tax implementation that relies on two separate schedules for labor
income and estates.
3.1 Implicit Marginal Taxes
For any allocation and constant R > 0 we can deﬁne the associated marginal tax rates τ(w0)
solving the Euler equation




Below, the constant R plays the role of the pre-tax gross interest rate. Since our economy has
no savings technology, this value is not uniquely pinned down in equilibrium—it is completely
unimportant for anything that follows. Diﬀerent values of R are associated with diﬀerent
levels for the tax, but they do not aﬀect its shape.
The ﬁrst-order condition for U1(w0), which is necessary and suﬃcient for optimality, is
ˆ β − β + βλ0C
′(U0(w0)) = λ1C
′(U1(w0)).
where λt is strictly positive lagrange multiplier on the resource constraint for period t. From
this equation it follows that U0(w0) and U1(w0) move in the same direction with w0. Since
U0(w0) + βU1(w0) must be increasing, in order to provide incentives, it follows that both
U0(w0) and U1(w0) are increasing; hence, both consumptions c0(w0) and c1(w0) are increasing
in w0.


















From the ﬁrst order condition for U it follows that 1/λ0 =
R ∞
0 (1/u′(c0(w)))dF(w). For what
follows we normalize so that R = λ0/λ1.
Our ﬁrst result, derived from equation (9) when ˆ β = β, can be viewed as simply restating
the celebrated Atkinson-Stiglitz uniform taxation result for our economy.
Proposition 1. When ˆ β = β the optimal allocation implies a zero marginal estate tax rate:
τ(w0) = 0 in equation (8) and the marginal rate of substitution u′(c1(w0))/u′(c0(w0)) is equated
8across all dynasties, i.e. for all w0.
Atkinson and Stiglitz (1976) showed that, provided preferences over a group of goods is
separable from work eﬀort, then consumption within this group should not be distorted. In
other words, the implied marginal taxes for these goods should be equalized to avoid distorting
their relative consumption—uniform taxation is optimal. In our context, this result applies
to consumption at both dates, c0 and c1, and implies that the ratio of marginal utilities is
equalized across agents—the estate tax can be normalized to zero.2
In contrast, whenever ˆ β > β equation (9) implies that the ratio of marginal utilities
is not equalized across agents: there must be some distortion, so the marginal estate tax
cannot be zero. Indeed, since consumption increases with productivity estate taxation must
be progressive.
Proposition 2. When ˆ β > β the optimal allocation implies a nonzero and progressive marginal
estate tax: τ(w0)  = 0 for all w0 and τ(w0) is increasing in w0. For R = ˆ β the marginal tax
rate is









and c0(w0), c1(w0) and y0(w0) are increasing in w0.
We emphasize that the interesting implication for the tax rate here is that it increases
with productivity: taxation is progressive. Without an aggregate savings technology the
overall level of estate tax cannot be uniquely pinned down, it is completely irrelevant. Farhi,
Kocherlakota and Werning (2005) extends the analysis to an economy with capital, which
pins down the level of estate taxation.
3.2 A Simple Tax Implementation
We next show that we can implement eﬃcient allocations, and the progressive implicit marginal
tax rates that go with them, with a simple tax system. In our implementation, the government
confronts parents with two separate schedules: an income tax and an estate tax. We say that




2 and T b(b)
if, for all w0, the allocation (c0(w0),c1(w0),y0(w0)) solves
max
c0,c1,y0
{u(c0) + βu(c1) − h(y0/w0)}
2 One diﬀerence is that Atkinson and Stiglitz (1976) assume a linear technological transformation be-
tween goods, whereas we assume no possible transformation. Their result on uniform taxation implies that
marginal rates of substitution are equalized across agents and that they are all equal to the marginal rate of
transformation. Our result only emphasizes the former.
9subject to




c1 = Rb1 + y2 − T
y
2.
It is trivial to change things so that it is the child that pays the estate tax at t = 1.
Furthermore, without loss of generality we can assume that y2 − T
y
2 = 0. To see this, deﬁne
ˆ b1 ≡ b1 + (y2 − T2)/R then
c0 +ˆ b1 = y0 − T





= y0 − ˆ T
b(ˆ b1) − ˆ T
y(y0)




2(y0) and ˆ T b(ˆ b1) = T b(ˆ b1 − (y2 − T2)/R).
Our next result establishes formally that eﬃcient allocations can be implemented with
separate nonlinear income and estate taxation. The idea is to deﬁne T b(b) so that
1
1 + T b′(c1(w))
= 1 − τ(w)
The proof then exploits the fact that marginal tax rates are progressive to ensure that the
bequest problem faced by the parent is convex.
Proposition 3. Suppose c0(w0), c1(w0), y0(w0) and τ(w0) are increasing functions. Then
there exists tax functions T y(y) and T b(b) that implements this allocation, with T b(b) convex.
Proof. Use the generalized inverse of c1(w), where possible ﬂat portions of c1(w) deﬁne dis-






and normalize so that T b(0) = 0. Note that by the monotonicity of τ(w) and c0(w), the
function T b(b) is convex. Next deﬁne net income
I(w0) ≡ c0(w0) + R
−1c1(w0) + T
b(c1(w0))
We can express this in terms of output y by using the inverse of y0(w0): Iy(y) ≡ I(y
−1
0 (y)).
Then we let T y(y0) ≡ y0 −Iy(y0). Finally, let the consumption allocation as a function of net
income I be: (ˆ c0(I),ˆ c1(I)) ≡ (c0(I−1(I)),c1(I−1(I))).
We now show that the constructed tax functions, T y(y) and T b(b), implement the alloca-
10tion. For any given net income I the consumer solves the subproblem:
V (I) ≡ max{u(c0) + βu(c1)}
subject to c0 + R−1c1 + T b(c1) ≤ I. This problem is convex, the objective is concave and the
constraint set is convex, since T b is convex. It follows that the ﬁrst-order condition
1 =
βR
1 + T b′(b)
u′(c1)
u′(c0)
suﬃcient for optimality. Combining equation (8) and equation (11) it follows that these
conditions for optimality are satisﬁed by ˆ c0(I),ˆ c0(I) for all I. Hence V (I) = u(ˆ c0(I)) +
βu(ˆ c0(I)).
Next, consider the worker’s maximization over y0 given by
max
y {V (I(y)) − h(y/w0)}.
We need to show that y0(w0) solves this problem, which implies that the allocation is im-
plemented since consumption would be given by ˆ c0(I(y0(w0))) = c0(w0) and ˆ c1(I(y0(w0))) =
c1(w0). Now, from the previous paragraph and our deﬁnitions it follows that
y0(w0) ∈ argmax
y {V (I(y)) − h(y;w0)}
⇔ y0(w0) ∈ argmax
y {u(ˆ c0(I(y))) + βu(ˆ c1(I(y))) − h(y/w0)}
⇔ w0 ∈ argmax
w {u(c0(w)) + βu(c1(w)) − h(y0(w)/w0)}
Thus, the ﬁrst line follows from the last, which is guaranteed by the assumed incentive
compatibility of the allocation, equation (6). Hence, y0(w0) is optimal and it follows that
(c0(w0),c1(w0),y0(w0)) is implemented by the constructed tax functions.
3.3 Discussion
Without estate taxation there is perfect inheritability of welfare. In particular, consumption
of parents and child move in tandem, one-for-one. This situation is only optimal when the
children are not considered independently in the welfare criterion, so that insuring them
against the risk of their parent’s fortune is not valued.
In contrast, when insurance is provided to the children’s generation their consumption
still varies with their parent’s, but less than one-for-one. The intergenerational transmission
of welfare is imperfect: consumption mean reverts across generations. The progressivity of
11the estate tax schedule reﬂects this mean reversion. Fortunate parents must face a lower net
returns on bequests in order to give them incentives to tilt their consumption towards the
present, that is, towards themselves. Likewise poorer parents need to face higher net returns
so that their consumption slopes upward. This explains the progressivity of estate taxes.
Another intuition is based on the interpretation of altruism as a form of externality. In
the presence of externalities, some form of corrective Pigouvian taxes are generally desirable.
Think of a parental bequest as a consumption good with a positive externality to the child;
then the Pigouvian logic implies that we should subsidize bequests. Since expected utility is
our concern, and utility is concave, this externality is greatest for children with low consump-
tion. Thus, the subsidy rate should be highest—or equivalently, the negative tax should be
lowest—for poor parents. Optimal estate taxation is thus progressive. Since our economy has
no capital, the Pigouvian level of taxation turns out to be irrelevant—we may tax or subsidize
estates. However, the relative tax conclusion in this argument remains robust.
None of these arguments require the private-information structure. However, if productiv-
ity or eﬀort were observable, then the ﬁrst-best allocation would be achievable. Consumption
and wealth would then be equated across parents. Although one can still think of a progres-
sive estate tax in this situation for out-of-equilibrium levels of parental wealth, it becomes
irrelevant given the lack of parental inequality. In this sense, our results rely on an interaction
between redistributive and corrective motives for taxation (see also Amador, Angeletos and
Werning, 2005).
4 A Mirrleesian Economy with Inﬁnite Horizon
We now turn to a repeated version of this economy with an inﬁnite horizon, as in Albanesi and
Sleet (2004). All generations work and receive a random productivity draw. An individual
born into generation t has ex-ante welfare vt solving
vt = Et−1[u(ct) − h(nt) + βvt+1],
where β < 1 is the coeﬃcient of altruism. We assume that the utility function over consump-
tion satisﬁes the Inada conditions u′(0) = ∞ and u′(∞) = 0. We adopt a power disutility
function h(n) = nγ/γ with γ > 1 to ensure that the planning problem is convex.
An individual with productivity w, exerting work eﬀort n, produces output y = w   n.










12where θt ≡ w
−γ
t can be interpreted as a taste shock to producing output. Productivity wt,
and hence θt, is independently and identically distributed across dynasties and generations
t = 0,1... With innate talents assumed nonheritable, intergenerational transmission of welfare
is not mechanical linked through the environment but may arise to provide incentives for
altruistic parents.
Since productivity shocks are assumed to be privately observed by individuals and their
descendants each dynasty faces a sequence of consumption functions {ct}, where ct(θt) repre-
sents an individual’s consumption after reporting the history θt ≡ (θ0,θ1,...,θt). A dynasty’s
reporting strategy σ ≡ {σt} is a sequence of functions σt : Θt+1 → Θ that maps histories of
shocks θt into a current report ˆ θt. Any strategy σ induces a history of reports σt : Θt+1 → Θt+1.
We use σ∗ to denote the truth-telling strategy with σ∗
t(θt) = θt for all θt ∈ Θt+1.


































for all strategies σ.
We identify dynasties by their initial utility entitlement v0 with distribution ψ in the
population. An allocation is a sequence of functions {cv
t,yv
t} for each v, where cv
t(θt) and
yv
t(θt) represents the consumption and income that a dynasty with initial entitlement v gets
at date t after reporting the sequence of shocks θt. For any given initial distribution of
entitlements ψ and resources e, we say that an allocation {cv
t} is feasible if: (i) it is incentive
compatible for all dynasties; (ii) it delivers expected utility of v to all initial dynasties entitled
to v; and (iii) average consumption in the population does not exceed the ﬁxed endowment e














t)dψ(v) t = 0,1,... (14)




















with ˆ β > β. The ﬁrst term is exogenously given, since we take as given a distribution for the









Future generations are already indirectly valued through the altruism of the current genera-
tion. If, in addition, they are also directly included in the welfare function the social discount
factor must be higher than the private one (see Farhi and Werning, 2005, for more details).
When ˆ β = β, the planning problem seeks the lowest constant resource level e to ensure that
there exists a feasible allocation that delivers the distribution of utility entitlements ψ. This is
precisely the eﬃciency problem studied in Albanesi and Sleet (2004). When ˆ β > β we deﬁne
the social optimum as maximizing the average social welfare function (16), weighed by ψ, over
all feasible allocations. That is, the social planning problem given an initial distribution of










subject to the the resource constraints (14), as well as the promise keeping and incentive
constraints: v = U({cv
t},σ∗;β) and U({cv
t},σ∗;β) ≥ U({cv
t},σ;β) for all initial entitlements v
and strategies σ.
We are interested in distributions of utility entitlements ψ such that the solution to the
planning problem features, in each period, a cross-sectional distribution of continuation utili-
ties vt that is also distributed according to ψ. We also require the cross-sectional distribution
of consumption and income to replicate itself over time. We term any initial distribution of
entitlements with these properties a steady state and denote them by ψ∗. Following Farhi and
Werning (2005), we approach the planning problem by studying a relaxed version of it. The
solutions to both problems coincide for steady state distributions ψ∗, which is all we seek to
characterize. The relaxed problem has continuation utility as a state variable that follows a
Markov process. Steady states are then invariant distributions of this Markov process.
Deﬁne the relaxed planning problem to be equivalent to the social planning problem except


















1 − ˆ β
e. (18)

































and study the maximization of L subject to v = U({cv
t},σ∗;β) ≥ U({cv
t},σ;β) for all v and
σ. For any endowment level e, there exists a unique positive multiplier ˆ λ(e) so that the
maximizing this Lagrangian is equivalent to solving the relaxed problem. Maximizing L is
equivalent to the pointwise optimization, for each v, of the subproblem:
k(v) ≡ supL
v (20)
subject to v = U({c(uv
t)},σ∗;β) ≥ U({c(uv
t)},σ;β) for all σ.
The value function of the component planning problem k(v) deﬁned by equation (20) is























′) for all θ,θ
′ ∈ Θ. (23)
Denote by gw(v,θ) and gu(v,θ) the optimal policy function for w and u. The next lemma
characterizes some key properties of the value function k(v).
Lemma 1. The value function k(v) is strictly concave and continuously diﬀerentiable on (v,v)
where v = −∞; it is unbounded below on both sides limv→v k(v) = limv→¯ v k(v) = −∞; and
the derivative has limv→v k′(v) = 1 and limv→¯ v k′(v) = −∞.
5 Steady States and Progressive Taxation
We are interested in steady state distributions ψ∗ that have no mass at misery v. Our ﬁrst
result is that this is not possible when future generations are not weighed directly, so that
ˆ β = β. We then show that, in contrast, whenever ˆ β > β a steady state distribution exists
with no mass at misery. The eﬃcient allocation displays a form of mean reversion across
generations that keeps inequality bounded. The mean reversion is characterized by a modiﬁed
inverse Euler equation which implies that estate taxation is progressive.
155.1 An Immiseration Result
For β = ˆ β, we have to modify our deﬁnition for the Social Planning problem. For any
distribution ψ of initial welfare entitlements, the planning problem is to minimize the net
resources required to deliver the utility entitlements in an incentive compatible way:
inf e (24)








t))dψ(v) ≤ e (25)
U({c
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t},σ;β) for all v and σ (27)
From this program, we can deﬁne an invariant distribution exactly as in Section 4 of the
paper. We are interested in steady state distributions ψ∗ without full mass at misery. Our
ﬁrst result is that this is basically not possible when β = ˆ β.
Proposition 4. Suppose that limu→∞ supc′′(u)/c′(u) < ∞. Then if β = ˆ β, there exists no
invariant distribution ψ∗ without full mass at misery.
This result extends the immiseration result in Atkeson and Lucas (1992), who study an
endowment economy with privately observed taste shocks, instead of the Mirrleesian pro-
duction economy with privately observed productivity shocks studied here. They show that
the cross-sectional distribution of consumption disperses steadily over time, with inequality
growing without bound. As a result, almost everyone converges to the misery, consuming
nothing, while a vanishing fraction tend towards bliss, consuming the entire aggregate en-
dowment. Thus, no steady state distribution with positive consumption exists. To the best
of our knowledge Proposition 4 is the ﬁrst formal statement of an analogous result in the
context of a Mirrleesian economy, where private information is regarding productivity shocks.
Researchers that assume ˆ β = β have been typically forced to impose an ad hoc lower bound
on continuation utility to avoid misery and ensure that an steady-state distribution exists
(Atkeson and Lucas, 1995; Albanesi and Sleet, 2004).
5.2 Steady States and a Modiﬁed Inverse Euler Equation
We now return to eﬃcient allocations where future generations are given positive weight.
We ﬁrst derive an important intertemporal condition that must be satisﬁed by the optimal
16allocation. This condition has interesting implications for the optimal estate tax, computed
later.
Let λ be the multiplier on the promise-keeping constraint and let µ(θ,θ′) represent the
multipliers on the incentive constraints. Then the ﬁrst-order conditions for interior solutions
for u(θ) and w(θ) are
p(θ) − ˆ λc





















′,θ) = 0 (29)




















so that β/ˆ β < 1 acts as an autoregressive coeﬃcient ensuring that over time the derivative
k′(vt) mean reverts back to zero, where the function k(v) ﬁnds its interior maximum. The
mean-reverting force provided by ˆ β > β is crucial for the existence of steady state distributions
with bounded inequality, which we prove below. In contrast, when ˆ β = β no such central
tendency exists, increasing inequality and immiseration ensues and no steady state exists
(Proposition 4).
The optimal resolution of the tradeoﬀ between incentives for altruistic parents and in-
surance for newborns gives rise to a less than one-for-one intergenerational transmission of
welfare—in contrast to the case where ˆ β = β. The descendants of a rich parent are more
fortunate than those of a poor parent, but less and less so the more distant is the descendant:
the impact of the initial fortune of dynasties dies out over generations.
The more weight is put on future generations, the higher is ˆ β compared to β, and the
less intense is the link between the welfare of parents and child. But as we will now show,
even the smallest amount of mean-reversion in the form of ˆ β > β puts enough limits on
the transmission of shocks across generations to prevent the distribution of consumption and
welfare from exploding.









′(v) = 1 − ˆ λc
′(u−), (32)
where u− should be interpreted as the previous period’s assignment of utility from consump-
tion. Substituting relations in equation (32) into the CLAR equation (30) we arrive at a


















The left-hand side together with the ﬁrst term on the right-hand side is the standard inverse
Euler equation. The second term on the right-hand side is novel, since it is zero when β = ˆ β
and is strictly negative when ˆ β > β.3
We now show that a steady state exists whenever the welfare criterion places direct weight
on children so that ˆ β > β. The proof follows Farhi and Werning (2005) quite closely, which
proves such a result for an economy with taste shocks.
Proposition 5. (a) There exists an invariant distribution ψ∗ for the Markov process {vt}
implied by gw. Moreover any invariant distribution ψ∗ has a support bounded away from
misery v. (b) Suppose that limu→∞ supc′′(u)/c′(u) < ∞, then any invariant distribution
necessarily has a support bounded away from v.
An invariant distribution always exists, but when absolute risk aversion is bounded, so
that limu→∞ supc′′(u)/c′(u) < ∞,4 the invariant distribution has a compact support, that is
bounded away from misery. It follows directly that the allocation implied by the invariant
distribution has consumption and work eﬀort that are bounded above. This ensures that the
invariant ψ∗ is also a steady state of the original planning problem, for some endowment level
e.5
The result relies heavily on the force for mean reversion that is behind equation (31) and
equation (33). To see this mean-reversion force most clearly consider, as an example, the
logarithmic utility case, u(c) = log(c). Then 1/u′(c) = c and equation (33) can be written
3Farhi, Kocherlakota and Werning (2005) show that this equation, and its implications for estate taxation,
generalize to an economy with capital and an arbitrary process for skills.
4 This is the case for most common preference speciﬁcations, such as CARA or CRRA utility functions.
5 Indeed, the proof of this result actually shows that promised continuation utility vt is bounded for all
realizations of the shocks, starting from any v0 in the bounded support. It follows that promised utility vt is
bounded for all reporting strategies. This in turn implies that the proposed allocation is incentive compatible,
that is, that the temporary incentive constraints in equation (23) imply equation (13) (see Theorem 2 in Farhi
and Werning, 2005).





















¯ c + εt+1 with Et[εt+1] = 0
where ¯ c ≡ ˆ λ−1 is average consumption at the steady-state cross-sectional distribution. As the
last expression indicates, with logarithmic utility, consumption itself is autoregressive with an
autoregressive coeﬃcient equal to β/ˆ β < 1.
5.3 Tax Implementation
Any allocation that is incentive compatible and feasible, and has strictly positive consumption,
can be implemented by a combination of taxes on labor income and estates. Here we ﬁrst
describe this implementation, and explore some features of the optimal estate tax in the next
subsection.
For any incentive-compatible and feasible allocation {cv
t(θt), yv
t(θt)} we propose an imple-
mentation along the lines of Kocherlakota (2004). In each period, conditional on the history
of their dynasty’s reports ˆ θt−1 and any inherited wealth, individuals report their current shock
ˆ θt, produce, consume, pay taxes and bequeath wealth subject to the following set of budget
constraints











Rt−1,tbt−1 t = 0,1,... (34)
where Rt−1,t is the before-tax interest rate across generations, and initially b−1 = 0. Individuals
are subject to two forms of taxation: a labor income tax Tt(ˆ θt), and a proportional tax on
inherited wealth Rt−1,tbt−1 at rate τt(ˆ θt).6
Given a tax policy {T v
t (θt), τv
t (θt), yv
t(θt)}, an equilibrium consists of a sequence of interest
rates {Rt,t+1}; an allocation for consumption, labor income and bequests {cv
t(θt), bv
t(θt)}; and
a reporting strategy {σv
t(θt)} such that: (i) {ct, bt, σt} maximize dynastic utility subject
to (34), taking the sequence of interest rates {Rt,t+1} and the tax policy {Tt, τt, yt} as given;
and (ii) the asset market clears so that
R
E−1[bv
t(θt)]dφ(v) = 0 for all t = 0,1,... We say that
6In this formulation, taxes are a function of the entire history of reports, and labor income yt is mandated
given this history. However, if the labor income histories yt: Θt → Rt being implemented are invertible, then
by the taxation principle we can rewrite T and τ as functions of this history of labor income and avoid having
to mandate labor income. Under this arrangement, individuals do not make reports on their shocks, but
instead simply choose a budget-feasible allocation of consumption and labor income, taking as given prices
and the tax system.
19a competitive equilibrium is incentive compatible if, in addition, it induces truth telling.
For any feasible, incentive-compatible allocation {cv
t, yv
t}, with strictly positive consump-
tion we construct an incentive-compatible competitive equilibrium with no bequests by setting
T v












for any sequence of interest rates {Rt−1,t}. These choices work because the estate tax ensures
that for any reporting strategy σ, the resulting consumption allocation {cv
t(σt(θt))} with no
bequests bv

































The labor income tax is such that the budget constraints are satisﬁed with this consumption
allocation and no bequests. Thus, this no-bequest choice is optimal for the individual regard-
less of the reporting strategy followed. Since the resulting allocation is incentive compatible,
by hypothesis, it follows that truth telling is optimal. The resource constraints together with
the budget constraints then ensure that the asset market clears.7
As noted above, in our economy without capital only the after-tax interest rate matters
so the implementation allows any equilibrium before-tax interest rate {Rt−1,t}. In the next
subsection, we set the interest rate to the reciprocal of the social discount factor, Rt−1,t = ˆ β−1.
This choice is natural because it represents the interest rate that would prevail at the steady
state in a version of our economy with capital.
5.4 Optimal Progressive Estate Taxation
In our environment, the relevant past history is encoded in the continuation utility so the
estate tax τ(θt−1,θt) can actually be reexpressed as a function of vt(θt−1) and θt. Abusing
notation we then denote the estate tax by τt(v,θt). Since we focus on the steady-state,
invariant distribution, we also drop the time subscripts and write τ(v,θ).
The average estate tax rate ¯ τ(v) is then deﬁned by







7Since the consumption Euler equation holds with equality, the same estate tax can be used to implement
allocations with any other bequest plan with income taxes that are consistent with the budget constraints.
20Using the modiﬁed inverse Euler equation (33) we obtain








In particular, this implies that the average estate tax rate is negative, ¯ τ(v) < 0, so that
bequests are subsidized. However, recall that before-tax interest rates are not uniquely de-
termined in our implementation. As a consequence, neither are the estate taxes computed
by (35). With our particular choice for the before-tax interest rate, however, the tax rates
are pinned down and acquires a corrective, Pigouvian role. Diﬀerences in discounting can
be interpreted as a form of externalities from future consumption, and the negative average
tax can then be seen as a way of countering these externalities as prescribed by Pigou. In
our setup without capital, this result depends on the choice of the before-tax interest rate.
However, the negative tax on estates would be a robust steady-state outcome in a version of
our economy with capital.
In our model it is more interesting to understand how the average tax varies with the
history of past shocks encoded in the promised continuation utility v. The average tax is an
increasing function of consumption, which, in turn, is an increasing function of v. Thus, estate
taxation is progressive: the average tax on transfers for more fortunate parents is higher.
Proposition 6. In the repeated Mirrlees economy, an optimal allocation with strictly positive
consumption can be implemented by a combination of income and estate taxes. At a steady-
state, invariant distribution ψ∗, the optimal average estate tax ¯ τ(v) deﬁned by (35) and (36)
is increasing in promised continuation utility v.
The progressivity of the estate tax reﬂects the mean-reversion in consumption. The for-
tunate must face lower net rates of return so that their consumption path decreases towards
the mean.8
6 Concluding Remarks
When only the ﬁrst generation’s welfare is of concern, we obtain familiar results that echo
those obtained in intragenerational settings. In particular, in our simple two-period economy
we recover Atkinson-Stiglitz’s uniform-taxation result. As a consequence, bequests should be
undistorted and the transmission of welfare perfect: consumption of parent and child should
move one-for-one. In our inﬁnite-horizon model, we prove an immiseration result that parallels
8Farhi, Kocherlakota and Werning (2005) explore more general versions of this result and discuss other
intuitions.
21Atkeson-Lucas’: a dynasty’s consumption inherits a random walk property, inequality grows
without bound and everyone converges to misery.
In contrast, when the expected welfare of future generations is taken into account, the
planner values insuring children against the family they are born into. We characterize eﬃcient
allocations and study the role that estate taxation can play in implementing these allocations.
We ﬁnd that the estate tax should be progressive to ensure that consumption and welfare
exhibit mean-reversion across generations. Inequality is then bounded: a steady-state cross-
section for consumption and welfare exists.
Farhi, Kocherlakota and Werning (2005) explore some extensions—by including physical
capital accumulation, modeling life-cycle elements and allowing skills to be correlated across
generations—and show that the main result on progressive estate taxation holds. However,
a number of issues are still unexplored. For example, the eﬀects of parental investments in
the child’s human capital, of endogenous and variable fertility, and of intervivo transfers all
remain open questions for future research.
22Appendix
A Proof of Lemma 1
Strict concavity and diﬀerentiability follow from standard arguments. In order to derive the
limits of k and k′ at the bounds of the domain, we derive a lower bound kmin and an upper
bound kmax, for which we can easily compute the corresponding limits.
Consider the solution {uv0(θt),yv0(θt)} to the relaxed planning problem for a given v0. For






























t) − ˆ λc(u
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v (θt)} is incentive compatible and delivers welfare level v, we have k(v) ≥
kmin(v), for all v ≤ v0. We have
k
min′(v) = 1 − ˆ λE
￿
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This corresponds to the relaxed planning problem, but without the incentive constraints.




u − ˆ λc(u) + ˆ λy − θh(y)
Then





t) − ˆ λc(u(θ













































max(v) = v − C(v) + m
￿
1






¯ k(v) ≤ k
max(v)
Denote by {uC(θt,v),yC(θt,v)} the solution of the program deﬁning C. Combining the ﬁrst




























































B Proof of Proposition 4
In order to characterize the optimal allocation it is convenient to study a relaxed problem.
The Lagrangian theorem guarantees that there exists a unique sequence of multipliers {qt}





































t},σ;β) for all σ
Hence C(v;{qt}) is the least possible cost of an incentive compatible allocation delivering
welfare v to the ﬁrst generation. It is trivial to see that C(v;{qt}) is the solution of the
following Bellman equation





v = E[uθ + βwθ − θhθ]
uθ + βwθ − θhθ ≥ uθ′ + βwθ′ − θhθ′
For future use, let us denote by gw(v,θt) the continuation utility after a history of shock
θt when the initial welfare entitlement is v.
Suppose there exists an invariant distribution ψ∗, and let {qt} be the associated sequence
of multipliers. Since ψ is a state variable for (24), this shows that qt+1/qt is independent of
t. Hence there exists 0 < q < 1 such that qt+1/qt = q for all t. We can therefore drop the
time dependence on the sequence {qt} in Ct(v;{qt}), and simply write C(v) as a shortcut for
C(v,{qt}t≥0).
Lemma 2. Suppose there exists an invariant distribution ψ∗ without full mass at misery.
Then q ≥ β.
Proof. We will make use of two possible state variables. The ﬁrst state variable is the natural
one: v, promised future utility. The other one is utility attained by the previous generation








The existence of an invariant distribution ψ∗(v) with not mass at misery is equivalent to the
existence of an invariant distribution ˆ ψ∗(u−) with no mass at misery.
Let xθ = uθ + βwθ. Then we can rewrite the Bellman equation (37) as
C(v) = inf E[c(uθ) − y(hθ) + qC(wθ)]
subject to
v = E[xθ − θhθ]
26xθ − θhθ ≥ xθ′ − θhθ′
uθ + βwθ = xθ
Hence, given a value x for xθ, uθ and wθ are given by the sub-program
minc(u) + qC(w)
subject to
u + βw = x
The solution is given by the ﬁrst order condition
c


















This in turn implies that there exists M > 0 such that
max
θ,θ′ |uθ′ − uθ| < M max
θ
hθ










































￿ ≤ uθ − u−








￿ − M max
θ′∈Θ
hθ′ ≤ uθ − u−









¯ pn(un + βwn − ¯ θnhn)
−θnhn + un + βwn ≥ −θnhn+1 + un+1 + βwn+1 for n = 1,2,...,K − 1,
This problem and its notation require some discussion. We do not incorporate the monotonic-
ity constraint on h. But this notation allows us to consider bunching in the following way. If
any set of neighboring agents is bunched, then we group these agents under a single index and
let ¯ pn be the total probability of this group. Likewise let ¯ θn represent the conditional average
of θ within this group, which is what is relevant for the promise-keeping constraint and the
objective function. Let θn be the shock of the highest agent in the group. The incentive
constraint must rule the highest agent in each group from deviating and taking the allocation
of the group above him.
Of course, every combination of bunched agents leads to a diﬀerent program. The op-
timal allocation of our problem must solve one of these programs with a strictly monotone
allocation—since bunching can be characterized by regrouping agents. Thus, below we char-
acterize solutions to these programs with strict monotonicity of the solution.
The ﬁrst order conditions for hn is
y
′(hn) = C
′(v) ¯ θn + θnµn,n+1 − θn−1µn−1,n.
This implies in particular that at the optimum, for any of these programs (and hence for the




It is easy to verify that C ≥ ˆ C, where ˆ C is the solution to (37) without the incentive
28compatibility constraints. Let ¯ v be the upper bound of the domain for v. Since both C and
ˆ C are increasing and convex, and since
lim
v→v















′(hθ(v)) = ∞ ⇒ lim
v→v
hθ(v) = 0
and since hθ has is decreasing in θ,
lim
v→v
hθ(v) = 0 for all θ ∈ Θ











Suppose that q < β. This implies that for v or equivalently u− high enough, the policy
functions uθ are all such that uθ > u−. This in turn implies that ˆ ψ∗ necessarily has a support

























Since ψ∗ doesn’t have full mass at misery, we have
R
C′(v)dψ∗(v) > 0. This in turn implies
that β = q, a contradiction.






we see that C′(vt) is a positive supermartingale. By the martingale convergence theorem, for





v ] ≤ C
′(v).
Suppose that there must exists a v∗ such that Pr(C′∞
v∗ > 0). We will show that this is not
possible.
For any realization θ∞ deﬁne the set of periods where θt takes on some particular value




Then since Θ is ﬁnite, we have that with probability one all values of θ occur inﬁnitely often
Pr(#Oθ(θ
∞) = ∞ for all θ ∈ Θ) = 1.
Hence there exists an event θ∞ such that C′(gw(v∗,θt(θ∞))) converges to a positive and ﬁnite
value, and #Oθ(θ∞) = ∞ for all θ ∈ Θ. Hence gw(v∗,θt(θ∞)) converges to a ﬁnite value w∗.
Since gw(v,θ) is continuous in v, and #Oθ(θ∞) = ∞ this implies that gw(w∗,θ) = w∗ for all
θ ∈ Θ. This implies that the incentive constraints are not binding at w∗, a contradiction.
Hence Pr(C′∞
v > 0) = 0 for all v. Therefore for all v, C′(gw(v,θt)) converges almost surely
to 0. This in turn implies that the stochastic process C′(vt) converges almost surely to 0. This
implies that C′(vt) converges in distribution to 0. Since ψ∗ is an invariant distribution, C′(vt)
is distributed as C′(v0). This implies that the distribution of C′(v0) has full mass at zero, i.e.
that ψ∗ has full mass at misery.
C Proof of Proposition 5
We start with two lemmas, and then proceed to prove the proposition.








≤ 1 − k
′(g







for all θ ∈ Θ, where the constants are given by ¯ γ ≡ (β/ˆ β) max
1≤n≤N{(1 + θn − E[θ | θ ≤ θn])/θn}
and γ ≡ (β/ˆ β) min
2≤n≤N{1 + θn−1 − E[θ | θ ≥ θn]/θn−1}.









¯ pn(un + βwn − ¯ θnhn)
−θnhn + un + βwn ≥ −θnhn+1 + un+1 + βwn+1 for n = 1,2,...,K − 1,
This problem and its notation require some discussion. We do not incorporate the monotonic-
ity constraint on h. But this notation allows us to consider bunching in the following way. If
any set of neighboring agents is bunched, then we group these agents under a single index and
let ¯ pn be the total probability of this group. Likewise let ¯ θn represent the conditional average
of θ within this group, which is what is relevant for the promise-keeping constraint and the
objective function. Let θn be the shock of the highest agent in the group. The incentive
constraint must rule the highest agent in each group from deviating and taking the allocation
of the group above him.
Of course, every combination of bunched agents leads to a diﬀerent program. The op-
timal allocation of our problem must solve one of these programs with a strictly monotone
allocation—since bunching can be characterized by regrouping agents. Thus, below we char-
acterize solutions to these programs with strict monotonicity of the solution.
The ﬁrst-order conditions are
¯ pn{ˆ λy
′(hn) − ¯ θn + λ¯ θn} − θnµn + θn−1µn−1 ≤ 0
¯ pn{ˆ βk
′(wn) − βλ} + β(µn − µn−1) = 0
where, by the envelope condition λ = k′(v).
Summing the ﬁrst-order conditions for hn, we get
ˆ λE[y
′(h(θ))] = 1 − k
′(v)








The ﬁrst-order conditions for n = 1 imply







































































Similarly, writing the ﬁrst-order conditions for n = K, we get

































































































































′(v)) + 1 −
β
ˆ β


























< 1 = lim
v→vk
′(v),
for all θ ∈ Θ.
The following lemma describes the behavior of the optimal allocation when v goes to v.
Lemma 4. We have gu(v,θ) > u and lim
v→vgu(v,θ) = u, lim
v→vgh(v,θ) = ∞









¯ pn(un + βwn − ¯ θnhn)
−θnhn + un + βwn ≥ −θnhn+1 + un+1 + βwn+1 for n = 1,2,...,K − 1,
The ﬁrst order condition for un is 1−ˆ λc′(un) =
ˆ β





ˆ β, we have un > u. Moreover, since lim
v→vk′(v,θ) =
β











gh(v,θ) = ∞ follows from
ˆ λE[y
′(g












for all x < l if utility is unbounded below. For any probability distribution µ, let TQ(µ) be




for any Borel set A. Deﬁne
TQ,n ≡
TQ + T 2
Q +     + T n
Q
n
33For example, TQ,n(δx) is the empirical average of {k′(vt)}n
t=1 over all histories of length n
starting with k′(v0) = x. The following lemma establishes the existence of an invariant
distribution by considering the limits of {TQ,n}.
We are now able to prove a proposition that implies the ﬁrst part Proposition 5, and
describes an algorithm to construct an invariant distribution.
Proposition 7. For each x < l there exists a subsequence {TQ,φ(n)(δx)} that converges weakly,
i.e. in distribution, to an invariant distribution on (−∞,1) under Q.











Note that we have a continuous transition function Q(x,θ): (−∞,1) × Θ → (−∞,1).
We next show that the sequence {T n
Q(δx)} is tight, in that for any ε > 0 there exists a
compact set Kε such that T n
Q(δx)(Kε) ≥ 1 − ε, for all n. The expected value of the distribu-
tion T n
Q(δx) is simply E−1[k′(vt(θt−1))] with x = k′(v0) < 1. Recall that E−1[k′(vt(θt−1))] =







Q(δx)(−∞,−A)(−A) + (1 − T
n
Q(δx)(−∞,−A))1

















Since for all θ ∈ Θ, lim
v→−∞k′(v,θ) <
β




Q (δx)), so that
T
n














Q(δx)[Aε,1 − aε] ≥ ε
Taking Kε = [Aε,1−aε], this implies that {T n
Q(δx)}n≥1 is tight, and therefore {T n
Q(δx)}n≥0,
is tight.
Tightness implies that there exists a subsequence T
φ(n)
Q (δx) that converges weakly, i.e. in
distribution, to some probability distribution π on (−∞,1). Since Q(x,θ) is continuous in x,
then TQ(T
φ(n)











and since φ(n) → ∞ we must have TQ(π) = π.
Note that for any invariant distribution π, TQ(π) = π implies that the support of π is
contained in (−∞,
β
ˆ β]. This proves the second part of Proposition 5. We ﬁnally prove a
lemma that implies the last part Proposition 5.
Lemma 5. Suppose that limu→∞ supc′′(u)/c′(u) < ∞. Then any invariant distribution ˆ ψ
necessarily has a support bounded away from v.
Proof. We will make use of two possible state variables. The ﬁrst state variable is the natural
one: v, promised future utility. The other one is utility attained by the previous generation
u−. Indeed, from the ﬁrst order conditions, it is easy to see that these two state variables are
related by






The existence of an invariant distribution ψ∗(v) with not mass at misery is equivalent to the
existence of an invariant distribution ˆ ψ∗(u−) with no mass at misery.
Let xθ = uθ + βwθ. Then we can rewrite the Bellman equation (21) as
k(v) = supE[uθ − ˆ λc(uθ) − θhθ + ˆ λy(hθ) + ˆ βk(wθ)]
subject to
v = E[xθ − θhθ]
xθ − θhθ ≥ xθ′ − θhθ′
uθ + βwθ = xθ
35Hence, given a value x for xθ, uθ and wθ are given by the sub-program
maxu − ˆ λc(u) + ˆ βk(w)
subject to
u + βw = x
The solution is given by the ﬁrst order condition


























This in turn implies that there exists M > 0 such that
max
θ,θ′ |uθ′ − uθ| < M max
θ
hθ
Consider the program (C). The ﬁrst order condition for hn is
¯ pn{ˆ λy
′(hn) − ¯ θn + λ¯ θn} − θnµn + θn−1µn−1 ≤ 0











′(hθ(v)) = ∞ ⇒ lim
v→v
hθ(v) = 0
and since hθ has is decreasing in θ,
lim
v→v
hθ(v) = 0 for all θ ∈ Θ


























































= 1 for all θ ∈ Θ
This in turn proves that for u− high enough, all the policy functions uθ are such that uθ < u−.
Hence any invariant distribution ˆ ψ∗ necessarily has a support bounded away from u. This is
equivalent to saying that any invariant distribution ˆ ψ necessarily has a support bounded away
from v.
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